Cohorting children in a childcare setting: a strategy to reduce SARS-CoV-2 Delta transmission, August-September 2021.

Background: Childcare centres can be high-risk settings for SARS-CoV-2 transmission due to age, vaccination status, and infection control challenges. We describe the epidemiology and clinical characteristics of a childcare SARS-CoV-2 Delta outbreak. When the outbreak occurred, little was known about the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 ancestral and Delta strains among children. Vaccinations for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) were not mandatory for childcare staff, and children (< 12 years) were ineligible. Methods: A retrospective cohort design of childcare attendees was used to investigate age-cohorts exposure and transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We defined a case as a person who tested positive to SARS-CoV-2; we defined a close contact as a person who attended the childcare during 16-20 August 2021. Childcare centre exposures were defined by three cohorts: younger children (0-< 2.5 years) with designated staff; older children (2.5-5 years) with designated staff; and a staff-only group that moved between both age cohorts. We calculated the number and proportion of SARS-CoV-2 Delta infections, symptom profile and severity in children and adults, secondary attack rates, and relative risks (RR) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) to compare age-cohort exposures and SARS-CoV-2 infection. Results: There were 38 outbreak cases that tested positive to SARS-CoV-2 Delta infection, comprising one primary case, 11 childcare attendees and 26 household members. Child attendees were in two non-interacting groups, 0-< 2.5 years and 2.5-5 years, with designated staff, separate rooms, and independent ventilation. The greatest risk of infection to childcare attendees was in the < 2.5 years age cohort which had a secondary attack rate of 41% and were five times more likely to be infected with SARS-CoV-2 (RR = 5.73; 95% CI: 1.37-23.86; p ≤ 0.01). No identified transmission (n = 0/21) occurred in the ≥ 2.5 years age cohort. Conclusion: Young children play an important role in SARS-CoV-2 Delta transmission to their peers and staff in childcare settings and to household members. Cohorting may be effective at limiting the propagation of SARS-CoV-2 in childcare settings. These findings highlight a need for multi-layered mitigation strategies and implementation support to manage respiratory infection control challenges at childcares. If prevention measures are not in place, this may facilitate ongoing transmission in these settings and into the broader community.

Public health interventions successfully mitigated multiple incursions of SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant in the Australian Capital Territory.

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a unique opportunity to understand how real-time pathogen genomics can be used for large-scale outbreak investigations. On 12 August 2021, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) detected an incursion of the SARS-CoV-2 Delta (B.1.617.2) variant. Prior to this date, SARS-CoV-2 had been eliminated locally since 7 July 2020. Several public health interventions were rapidly implemented in response to the incursion, including a territory-wide lockdown and comprehensive contact tracing. The ACT has not previously used pathogen genomics at a population level in an outbreak response; therefore, this incursion also presented an opportunity to investigate the utility of genomic sequencing to support contact tracing efforts in the ACT. Sequencing of >75% of the 1793 laboratory-confirmed cases during the 3 months following the initial notification identified at least 13 independent incursions with onwards spread in the community. Stratification of cases by genomic cluster revealed that distinct cohorts were affected by the different incursions. Two incursions resulted in most of the community transmission during the study period, with persistent transmission in vulnerable sections of the community. Ultimately, both major incursions were successfully mitigated through public health interventions, including COVID-19 vaccines. The high rates of SARS-CoV-2 sequencing in the ACT and the relatively small population size facilitated detailed investigations of the patterns of virus transmission, revealing insights beyond those gathered from traditional contact tracing alone. Genomic sequencing was critical to disentangling complex transmission chains to target interventions appropriately.

Does 2x2 airplane passenger contact tracing for infectious respiratory pathogens work? A systematic review of the evidence.

We critically appraised the literature regarding in-flight transmission of a range of respiratory infections to provide an evidence base for public health policies for contact tracing passengers, given the limited pathogen-specific data for SARS-CoV-2 currently available. Using PubMed, Web of Science, and other databases including preprints, we systematically reviewed evidence of in-flight transmission of infectious respiratory illnesses. A meta-analysis was conducted where total numbers of persons on board a specific flight was known, to calculate a pooled Attack Rate (AR) for a range of pathogens. The quality of the evidence provided was assessed using a bias assessment tool developed for in-flight transmission investigations of influenza which was modelled on the PRISMA statement and the Newcastle-Ottawa scale. We identified 103 publications detailing 165 flight investigations. Overall, 43.7% (72/165) of investigations provided evidence for in-flight transmission. H1N1 influenza A virus had the highest reported pooled attack rate per 100 persons (AR = 1.17), followed by SARS-CoV-2 (AR = 0.54) and SARS-CoV (AR = 0.32), Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB, AR = 0.25), and measles virus (AR = 0.09). There was high heterogeneity in estimates between studies, except for TB. Of the 72 investigations that provided evidence for in-flight transmission, 27 investigations were assessed as having a high level of evidence, 23 as medium, and 22 as low. One third of the investigations that reported on proximity of cases showed transmission occurring beyond the 2x2 seating area. We suggest that for emerging pathogens, in the absence of pathogen-specific evidence, the 2x2 system should not be used for contact tracing. Instead, alternate contact tracing protocols and close contact definitions for enclosed areas, such as the same cabin on an aircraft or other forms of transport, should be considered as part of a whole of journey approach.